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AGRICUDTURE : A KEY ELEMENT IN GATT NEGOTIATIONS 
1. Since 1947, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) has been 
the principal forum for negotiations for the mutual reduction of tariffs and 
other obstacles to trade. 
2. The seventh round of multilateral trade talks since the Second World 
War, launched by the Tokyo Declaration of September 1973, has failed to go 
beyond the stage of preparatory talks. It is to be hoped that the political 
impetus will develop to carry the talks thr.ough to a successful conclusion: 
but negotiations are increasingly threaten'd by a wave of demands for higher 
protectionist walls as the world recession continues to take its toll of 
employment. Unless the present round of talks succeed, these demands may 
become fact, and ever greater limitations on free trade the instrument of 
national policy. 
3. Agricultural questions are essential, however, to a successful conclusion 
to the Tokyo round of negotiations : 
- due to the insistence of the U.S. that agriculture should not be dealt with 
separately from industrial questions~ 
- and in view of the demand of the developing countries, Whoso exports con-
sist largely of agricultural produce, that a more equitable international 
system be established. 
A compromise on agricultural questions between the Community and the USA 
is one necessary condition for the success of the Tokyo Round, particularly 
since the key products for the Community's agricultural trade partners, and 
for any major attempt to liberalise world agricultural trade, are those tem-
perate products (dairy products, beef and cereals) which form the cornerstone 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, and which benefit from the strongest price 
guarantees. This is true of the Community~ it is no less true of the 
United States. Any worthwhile agreement bf(ltween the two principal actors will 
require, therefore, a close examination of the relationship between trade 
obligations and internal policy. 
KEY PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE TALKS 
4. Differences in goals between domestic and trade policies are particularly 
difficult to reconcile, both at the political and the economic levels. 
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Agriculture, given geographical variations, dependence on climate and 
the ensuing need for support mechanisms, falls into a different category to 
the industrial sector, and cannot be considered merely in terms of tariff 
reduction. 
The basic aims of the Community's agricultural policy are defined by 
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome : a fair standard of living for the agricul-
tural Community, stability of markets, and availability of supplies to con-
sumers at reasonable prices. 
5. An open attitude to agricWtural negotiations is made more difficult for 
the conununity by the 5.ncreasing :inbalance in agricultural trade : United States 
agricultural exports to the conununity have increased from $1.8 million in 
1968, to $4.4 million in 1973 and $6.4 million in 1976, and now show a sur-
plus in favour of the United States of $ .2 million. 
takes over a quarter of all U.S. farm exports. 
The Community now 
6. At the same time, the Community is the principal trader in agricultural 
produce, and the second largest exporter, after the United States. Trade 
expansion is in the interest of both areas. The problem is to find a nego-
tiable package that 
a) will avoid extreme supply and demand fluctuations on world markets and 
minimize the drift to protectionism; 
b) and will unblock the deadlock that exists in talks on the individual 
products, wheat, beef and dairy produce. 
A series of related conunodity agreements is required. The cereals 
market has always held the key to agricultural trade talks. The differences 
between the U.S. and EEC on a future grains agreement (particularly the 
degree to which it should incorporate an active policy·of intervention in the 
I 
world market to stabilize prices) are open to solution. The extent to which 
such an agreement is politically possible depends on the willingness of the 
United States to adopt a more liberal approach to agricultural trade in other 
areas. 
CHANGING U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
7. Talks on agricultural trade have in recent years been held up as the 
u.s. waited for reform of the CAP and the EEC waited for the new u.s. adminis-
tration. 
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Following the entry into office of the Carter administration, progress 
towards a possible compromise seems more likely,·with a more open approach 
adopted and less insistence placed on questioning the principles of the CAP. 
8. Until recently, the United States was deeply involved, as were other 
countries, in policies to support farm incomes, partly through tariffs, formal 
import embargoes and quotas and informal arrangements with suppliers to limit 
shipments. Policy was directed towards domestic farm prices rather than 
trade expansion. In the course of the 1960s, official thinking became 
directed more towards the trade benefits that could derive from liberalization 
of farm trade policy. A number of studies indicated the trade gains that 
could be made through liberalization, particularly from the exports of animal 
products, grains, oil seeds, tobacco and cotton. Vigorous export policies 
for agricultural produce resulted in the expansion of valuable earnings from 
overseas sales. This strengthened the resolve of the U.S. Government to 
ensure that the Tokyo round of the GATT negotiations ~d to the significant 
liberalization of trade in agricultural produce. This late conversion to 
trade liberalization was highly selective in those products in which the u.s. 
had a clear competitive advantage. On the other h'and, for those commodities 
such as dairy products, in which the U.S. is clearly incompetitive, there is 
very strong resistance on the part of producers and their representatives in 
Congress to any liberalization. 
9. Even in the dairy sector, Which is the most protected sector of U.S. 
agriculture, it has appeared that there are no insurmountable economic objec-
tions to the removal of quotas. The impact on EEC exports ~uld be consid-
erable. If the u.s. had already lifted import restrictions in 1975, some 12 
billion pounds of milk equivalent may have entered that year, i.e. more than 
10% of U.S. production. At the moment, only 1.5 of U.S. needs are imported. 
The u.s. has calculated that initially incomes of u.s. dairy farms under fre~ 
trade conditions would drop by 20% - 30%, but that by 1980 the farms remaining 
in activity would obtain somewhat higher incomes than in the case of contin-
uing import restrictions. 
10. Clearly, it is of vital interest to the Community to encourage 
America along the road to a more open agricultural market. In milk pro-
ducts, wine alcohol and processed meats a partial solution to some of the 
surplus problems facing the Community could be found. 
This can only come about with a greater flexibility on the part of the 
Community. There can be no question of the Community abandoning the basic 
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principles of the CAP; but a greater flexibility in negotiating might bring 
abaut considerable progress, making it easier for both the Community and the 
U.S. to leave their entrenched positions and take a more positive negotiating 
role. Indeed, the Community has already indicated that its position on 
export refunds (one of the principal U.S. objections. to the CAP) might be 
adjusted. 
11. It is equally clear that agreements on· cereals would greatly reduce 
the cost of domestic support programmes in the United States and provide for 
a more stable market. 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
12. Resolution of the conflicts on farm policy between the EEC and the U.S. 
is one essential condition to a successful conclusion to the Tokyo Round. 
The second is to convince the developing countries that the international 
trading system is sufficiently responsive to their interests, and the needs 
of development policies. 
13. Since 1968, the Community has taken the lead in opening its borders to 
produce from developing countries, by means of the generalised pregerences 
system, and in seeking greater stability for the exports of developing coun-
tries through the Lorn~ Agreement. 
14. The United States has yet to make a significant contribution to the 
demands of the Third World, Which, if satisfied~ woQld provide a much needed 
stimulus to world trade. 
15. The task of reaching more stable world agricultural markets will be all 
the more difficult if the u.s. continues to refuse to recognise the trilateral 
nature of much of agricultural world trade, U.S.-EEC-developing countries, and 
offers the minimum of generalised preference concessions in the agricultural 
sector. 
CONCLUDING QUESTIONS 
16. One can conclude by saying that greater international specialization of 
agricultural produce, carried out in the framework of international commodity 
agreements, could lead to increased prosperity for:producers and greater 
stability on world markets. 
17. All parties, however, must benefit. The exceptional increase in American 
agricultural exports to the Community, particularly feed grains and soya, are 
partly at the base of the increase in Community milk production and the present 
surplus. 
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18. The EEC does not wish to contest these' imports.ftom the U.S.; but there 
~ 
must be a counterpart to allow the Community to face up to the impact of these 
imports on internal markets and at the same. time to reply to the views ~ut 
forward by America in the GATT negotiations. 
19. The principal interest of the EEC is to have the possibility to increase 
I I 
its exports of dairy produce to the American market. 
The question which must be asked, therefore, concerns the conditions 
under which the U.S. will agree to grant Community prOducers freer access to 
the American market. 
In which directions should the Community modify its present external 
agricultural policy : 
- modification of export refunds on dairy produce; 
- conclusion of an agreement to regulate the world cereals market, or the 
entry price into the Community; 
- or guarantees concerning future imports of soya or feed grain from the 
United States ? 
20. Finally, the Community wishes to know whether the United States intends 
to adopt as liberal.an approach to import of agricultural products from devel-
oping countries as that adopted by the Community. 
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